Cylchgronau Cymru

MORALE AND WAR EFFICIENCY NAPOLEON has told us that moral force is to physical-that is, to numbers, armament, and training-as three is to one. Moral force or morale is thus a matter of vital importance, and it is useful to try and reach an understanding of what it means and how it operates in war. It is difficult to determine precisely the state of the morale of a nation or of an army at any particular moment. Morale includes all those subtle forces and sub- conscious influences which, blended together, make up the will and the motive of a people or of an armed force. It is quite obvious that the morale of a country is reproduced in the morale of its army. The will to victory in the minds of the people at home, when based upon sound moral considera- tions, finds its expression in brave deeds and gallant acts in the trenches. If we examine the foundation of morale, we shall find that it rests upon two main supports first, upon a firm belief in the righteous- ness of the cause, and, secondly, upon the nation's confidence in the honesty, ability, and efficiency of the statesmen and naval and military leaders who direct and lead it. The first of these is a purely moral force. It is at its best when it is engaged in directing its energies towards a positive goal, and when it ceases to be merely negative in short, when it passes from the moral defensive to the moral offensive. At the beginning of the War, the morale of the German nation was at its highest pitch. It looked forward to positive results, to wide conquests, to the spread of Kultur," and to a world hegemony. So long as the progress of the Germany army was marked by a succession of victories, by the acquisi- tion of territories and the imposition of Kultur upon degenerate nations, the German people con- tinued to believe in the causes for which it was fighting. When, however, the number of victories dwindled, when the much-advertised decision appeared, like a will-of-the-wisp, to recede further and further away, when the prophecies of German statesmen and German military pundits were continually falsified, then the glamour of conquest began to shed its splendour, and even Kultur lost much of its attractiveness. The Kaiser no longer boasts to his armies of the New Empire which by their deeds of blood and iron they are creating for the Fatherland. He no longer invokes the Almighty to assist him in spreading his German Kultur." On the contrary, he has become a convert to the doctrine of self- defence. The Fatherland, he says, is surrounded by enemies, and he implores his people to defend their hearths and homes from the armies of the in- vaders. German morale at the beginning of the War was based upon national arrogance and the lust of conquest, and, as the War proceeded, the moral rottenness of the political aims of Germany became apparent. It is true that they were positive, but they were morally unsound. In the stress of uncertainty and the growing consciousness of the possibility of defeat, it became necessary to sub- stitute a new war aim which would rally to its support the nation and the army. Thus German war aims became negative. They passed from the offensive to the defensive, and under the cloak of this apparent new moral sanction, the Kaiser and his Ministers still hoped to realise their original scheme of con- quest. The reverse process has been going on among the Allies. At first they were on the defensive. It was a struggle for existence, but it assumed the form of a fight to keep their old positions, to maintain what they held. Their war aims were negative, rather than positive. There was little or no missionary enthusiasm. Gradually, however, they have emerged from the defensive to the offensive, and, at the same time, they have become imbued with positive war aims, which, briefly stated, include the creation of a new world-order, based upon the freedom of nationalities, the self-determination of all peoples, great and small, and the prevention of future wars by a Commonwealth of Nations leagued together to enforce arbitration, to limit armaments, and to promote free economic intercourse among all civi- lised countries. Contrary to the positive aims of Germany, the demand of the Allies has secured a moral foundation upon which it rests. It is a house built upon a rock and not upon the sand. It em- bodies the aspiration of every free democratic nation for the liberty and the welfare of the genera- tions yet unborn. Thus we see that the morale of tha Allies, resting upon this unassailable ideal, which, as Mr. Asquith has told us, "is no mere Utopia," is now reinforced by an offensive spirit that, in spite of any disappointments and set-backs, must triumph in the end. Now let us consider the other condition that we have mentioned, namely, efficiency on the part of our rulers and military chiefs in the conduct of the war. It can be said that in a country which found itself so unprepared as our own was in August, 1914, a great many mistakes were to be expected. This may be fully and frankly admitted, but the real ques-